Queensland's state disaster management group: An all agency response to an unprecedented natural disaster by Arklay, Tracey
9Natural disasters are increasingly costly in human 
and economic terms.2 In Australia, Queensland, due 
to geography and population density, has the greatest 
risk profile of any state (Risk Frontiers, 2011). While 
hardly an enviable position to be in, this also means 
that Queensland has extensive experience dealing with 
disasters. In the summer of 2010-11, the organisational 
learning3 by emergency agencies was seriously tested 
when almost 80 per cent of Queensland’s 1.8 million 
kilometre land mass was adversely affected by rain 
events that caused extensive flooding. This disaster 
was soon followed by Cyclone Yasi, one of the most 
severe cyclones in living memory. In the aftermath, 
36 people were dead (to date, three bodies have still 
not been recovered), in excess of five billion dollars 
of public and private infrastructure damaged or 
destroyed, and 2.5 million people adversely affected, 
as natural disaster relief and recovery arrangements 
were activated in all 73 of Queensland’s local 
government areas (Queensland Government, 2011, 
p. 3-4). Queensland’s disaster response is based on 
the four internationally recognised tenets of ‘Prevent, 
Prepare, Respond and Recover’, and the actions 
of disaster management agencies and volunteers 
during the 2010-11 event has been called ‘global best 
practice’ by outside observers.4 This article provides a 
descriptive account of the crisis unfolding in order to 
gain an understanding of the complexities confronting 
government and emergency agencies; analyses 
Queensland’s emergency model and suggests that in 
important ways Queensland is different from other 
jurisdictions. Finally the paper argues that these 
factors along with past experience contributed to  
an effective ‘global best practice’ effort in 2010/11. 
Methodology in judging success
Before proceeding, it is necessary to gauge 
the effectiveness and success of Queensland’s 
management of the 2010-11 ‘rain events’.5 The 
literature speaks of the difficulty in rating the relative 
success or failure of public policies and government 
activities, particularly in relation to the ‘paucity of 
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ABSTRACT 
Queensland’s management of unprecedented 
natural disasters in 2010-11 received 
worldwide acclaim. This article argues that 
the much publicised and largely effective 
response to extensive state-wide flooding 
and cyclone events was not an accident, 
but rather had foundations that were laid 
over many years of prior experience in 
preparing for a diverse range of natural 
disaster threats – including flood, cyclone, 
storm and fire. The organisational culture 
within the state’s emergency agencies and 
the ongoing planning and training at the 
operational level was important, as was the 
learning and adaptation that had occurred 
previously. Queensland’s largely ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to disaster management that gives 
responsibility to local government in the 
first instance, and prioritises collaboration 
is also an important part of the Queensland 
model. Effective collaboration requires 
good working relationships within and 
between government. In Queensland this 
was understood and modelled from senior 
management down, across the range 
of emergency agencies and the police. 
While many of these aspects exist in other 
jurisdictions, this paper argues that one 
key feature distinguishes Queensland’s 
management of disasters, namely the 
presence of the State Disaster Management 
Group, a high level senior officials group, 
that provides for authoritative, decision 
making and confirms Queensland’s claim to 
have an ‘all hazard, all agency’ approach to 
its disaster management arrangements.  
1  My thanks to Dr Anne Tiernan, Jim McGowan and the anonymous referee for their advice and comments on earlier drafts.
2  Organisational learning is often promoted in policy texts, but has not been broadly studied (Mahler 2010, p. 250).
3  ‘Queensland’s disaster recovery recognised on world stage’ 16 June 2011 at http://www.qldreconstruction.org.au/news-media/54
4  ‘Queensland’s disaster recovery recognised on world stage’ 16 June 2011 at http://www.qldreconstruction.org.au/news-media/54
5  Throughout December 2010, SDMG minutes confirm ‘rain event’ was the term used to describe the climatic conditions.
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policy oriented reflections’ on the relative success 
of crisis management (McConnell, 2011, p. 65). 
This difficulty is compounded when the outcomes 
or results are subject to the appraisal of ‘multiple 
constituencies’– as usually happens around crises, 
as there is frequently a lack of agreement between 
them as to what constitutes effectiveness, or success 
(Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 567).6 Not everyone 
agrees that the Queensland crisis was managed well. 
As any observer of the Queensland Flood Commission 
of Inquiry hearings would testify, stakeholders (for 
example, those assisting during disasters either as 
volunteers or as paid officials and those affected, such 
as flood victims or their families) use different criteria 
to judge success. 
Judging a crisis response as a success or failure 
presents the evaluator with a range of methodological 
dilemmas. For example how do we distinguish ‘success 
as a fact from success as interpretation’? (McConnell 
2011, p. 64). To assist, McConnell has devised a 
framework that plots success on a scale from outright 
success to complete failure. He suggests crisis 
management responses will usually fit somewhere 
along this spectrum – in categories labelled as 
‘durable success’ where success outweighs failures, 
to ‘conflicted success’ where successes and failures 
are equally balanced, to ‘precarious success’ where 
failures outweigh success. Bovens (2010, p.584) 
asserts that judging success should be distinguished 
between what he calls ‘process’ assessment and 
‘outcome’ assessment. McConnell (2011, p. 68) 
provides a working definition: 
A crisis management initiative is successful if it 
follows pre-anticipated and/or relevant processes 
and involves the taking of decisions which have the 
effect of minimising loss of life/damage, restoring 
order and achieving political goals, while attracting 
universal or near universal support and/no or 
virtually no opposition. 
Based on this definition, this paper argues that 
Queensland successfully managed the 2010/11 crises, 
a judgement supported too in the assessment of the 
QFCOI interim report, which was generally supportive of 
the ‘fundamental structure of the disaster management 
system’ and made no substantive recommendations for 
change before the next wet season (p. 115). This paper 
argues Queensland’s performance during this event, fits 
somewhere between outright success and the ‘durable 
success’ category on McConnell’s success spectrum, 
in that the success of the 2010-11 event outweighed any 
purported failures.7
Stakeholders interviewed for this study, attribute 
Queensland’s success to its prior experience in dealing 
with disasters as well as from learning from other 
jurisdictional experiences: Cyclone Larry (2006), the 
Gap storms (2008), the Victorian bushfires (2009) and 
6 As noted by Marsh and McConnell there are many claims about policy success, but few are supported by rigorous evidence.
7 While the QFCOI final report had 177 recommendations, it was generally satisfied with the work of emergency agencies. Its recommendations, 
particularly as they related to floodplain management, local planning instruments and future development taking flood considerations into 
account, is somewhat ambiguous, particularly as it relates to which jurisdiction – state or local – is responsible for final implementation (see 
McGowan, forthcoming).
Cyclone Yasi, one of Queensland’s ‘rain events’ during 2010-11. 
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Hurricane Katrina in the US (2005). Other states also 
have significant natural disaster experience. As such, 
that variable alone cannot fully explain Queensland’s 
‘global best effort’ mark. It is timely to ask therefore 
what are the key points of difference between 
Queensland and other States, and are these differences 
sufficient to understand the effective response and 
demonstrated capacity of emergency agencies in 
2010-11? Taking into account the subjective nature 
and inherent bias of judging success,8 it is argued that 
the 2010-11 response was a success for reasons that 
include both process and outcome related factors.
Process factors included: 
• Regular, often twice daily, meetings of the 
SDMG. Present were representatives from local 
government and NGOs, power, telecommunication 
organisations and charities which ensured informed 
decisions based on the most up-to-date information 
possible;
• demonstrable cooperation between the all those 
involved (government, NGOs, private companies, 
charities and the ADF);9 
• successful communication of up-to-date 
information was provided by the Premier and public 
officials after each SDMG meeting and broadcast 
across the state; 
• the Queensland Police Service worked cooperatively 
with other disaster agencies, and effectively 
used social media technology to communicate 
information and field queries. 
Outcome related factors included:
• no person going without clean drinking water 
despite up to ten communities with no water 
supplies or operating sewerage systems; 
• in the days immediately after the disasters, no 
person reported a public health issue;
• a good disaster response is highly reliant on trained 
volunteers and in these disasters 2600 additional 
SES volunteers were deployed; 
• offers of help were quickly matched with those 
urgently needing assistance; 
• power and telecommunication facilities were  
more quickly restored after cyclone Yasi than in 
previous disasters, notably the smaller, less intense, 
cyclone Larry (DCS senior personnel, pers. comm.,  
May 2011). 
The Queensland difference 
Australia’s ‘sunshine state’ is no stranger to natural 
disasters (defined in legislation to include cyclones, 
floods, storm, storm tide, tsunami and bushfires).10 
While other Australian states are also at risk from 
certain types of natural disasters, Queensland is 
unusually exposed to multiple threats. While it is  
the flooding and cyclones that are the most common 
threat in the summer months, these make up only one 
part of Queensland’s ‘complex disaster profile’ (senior 
personnel, pers. comm., June 2011). While Western 
Australia has a similar threat exposure, the overall risk 
is lowered because of the relatively sparse population 
in many parts of the state, whereas Victoria and South 
Australia are more exposed to fire hazard.11 Northern 
New South Wales shares the border with Queensland 
and is also exposed to similar weather conditions as 
southeast Queensland. Currently a memorandum  
of understanding is being developed between  
the two states to further develop cross-border  
SES arrangements.12
Queensland – Australia’s most decentralised 
mainland state. 
Since European settlement, successive Queensland 
governments have emphasised and promoted regional 
growth. This pattern of development has made 
Queensland the most decentralised state, with almost 
as many people living outside the South East region 
as in it (DEEDI, 2007). Currently there are 73 local 
government districts operating in Queensland (and a 
74th district in Weipa, which is managed by the mining 
company Rio Tinto Aluminium). Melbourne is closer to 
Brisbane than Cairns and so perhaps unsurprisingly, 
some in the far north regard their capital city and 
the government that resides there with suspicion. 
This fact explains why past state governments 
initiated community based cabinet meetings that 
take the executive to regional areas of Queensland. 
The dispersed, but relatively significant populations 
living in the regions, also has implications for the way 
the state’s disaster management arrangements are 
organised, and explains the practical necessity for its 
‘bottom-up’ approach to disaster management. 
Queensland’s disaster  
management arrangements 
Within Australia, federal constitutional arrangements 
ensure that primary responsibility for disaster 
management falls to each state or territory. Disaster 
8 According to McConnell (2011), benchmarks for judging success include matching what occurred with, the stated objectives of crisis managers, 
benefit for individuals/groups/localities under threat, level and speed of improvement, adherence to industry standards, adherence to laws and 
contingency plans, comparison with the crisis experience of another jurisdiction, level of expert/ political/ public support for the initiatives.
9 Again, while not unusual in Australia this cooperation is in marked contrast to the events in New Orleans in 2005. As the Mayor of New Orleans at 
the time of Hurricane Katrina noted: ‘I was still totally flabbergasted that by day three our federal and state governments had not pulled out all the 
stops to come and help us’. Later he attributed this lack of attention to one of three things – ‘race, class or partisan politics – Pick one as there 
was some sort of discrimination happening’(Nagin, C 2011 pp. 168, 186).
10 The Disaster Management Act 2003 defines a disaster as ‘a serious disruption in a community’ which may be caused by natural or human acts or 
omissions (An Overview of the Queensland Disaster Management System, p. 2).
11 National risk profiles are currently being prepared under the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience.
12 Queensland Government response to the QFCOI Interim Report 2011, p. 11.
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planning is premised upon the notion of shared 
responsibilities, partnerships and collaboration 
between government and non-government sectors. 
When a disaster strikes, the principle of subsidiarity 
dictates that initial decisions on how best to respond 
are devolved down to the local level which is closest to 
the people and hence ideally located for deciding what 
needs to be done in the first instance (Wilkins 2009, p.4). 
While the principle of subsidiarity applies to all 
Australian states, Queensland differs in its approach 
to disaster management because it operates an ‘all 
agency position’ as opposed to a combat agency 
model, whereby a particular, predetermined agency 
is responsible for managing a disaster in the first 
instance. Effectively this means that while in New 
South Wales, for example, NSW agriculture is the 
designated combat agency in any animal health 
emergency and the NSW Rural Fire Service is the 
agency of choice during a bushfire crisis (see NSW 
Emergency Management Arrangements, 2011), 
Queensland utilises a coordinated and focussed 
approach to disaster management, that not only 
includes government agencies but also involves non-
government organisations like the RSPCA, Red Cross 
and telecommunication and power companies. All of 
these organisations and agencies are represented on 
the State Disaster Management Group (SDMG).
Queensland’s disaster legislation 
Recognising that disaster management requires a 
comprehensive approach, the Disaster Management Act 
2003 updated 28-year Queensland legislation that was 
introduced after Brisbane’s 1974 floods and Darwin’s 
TC Tracy. The State Counter Disaster Organisation 
Act, passed in 1975, established the State Emergency 
Service (SES) and remained largely unchanged until 
the state government, responding to terrorist attacks 
in New York in 2001 and a Council of Australian 
Government (COAG) report in 2002 in the lead up to 
a scheduled CHOGM meeting in Coolum, introduced 
new legislation in 2003.13 This legislation replaced two 
state level committees with a ‘single peak disaster 
management, policy and decision making body’,  
the SDMG.14 
The SDMG was created to provide a quick response 
mechanism for both the development of disaster 
management policy and the planning, preparation and 
coordination of the resources needed in times  
of disaster.15 Initially comprising the Director-General 
(DG) of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, who 
remains the designated chairperson of the group, 
other members included the DG of the Department 
of Emergency Services (deputy chair-person), and 
other CEOs of selected departments. Following the 
machinery of government (MOG) changes in 2009 that 
reduced the total number of government departments 
to 13, all the DGs became members of the SDMG, 
which in ‘peace-time’ meets four times a year. Perhaps 
one unforeseen benefit was that with the smaller 
total number of government departments, all DGs 
became members – and as such were required to 
attend the quarterly meetings. The SDMG is therefore 
truly representative of every government department, 
empowered to make quick, authoritative decisions 
when necessary and enabled to take a whole-of-
government approach to disaster management (DCS 
senior personnel, pers. comm., June 2011). 
2600 SES volunteers were deployed during the response.
13 COAG has driven a great variety of changes in natural disaster management since 2002/03 – including a much greater emphasis on 
coordination (see Natural Disasters in Australia: Reforming mitigation, relief and recovery arrangements (August 2002). URL: http://www.
ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(99292794923AE8E7CBABC6FB71541EE1)~Natural+Disasters+in+Australia+-+Review.pdf/$file/
Natural+Disasters+in+Australia+-+Review.pdf
14 See Queensland Parliamentary Debates (QPD), Reynolds, M., Disaster Management Bill, 2nd reading speech, 29 October 2003.
15 State Disaster Management Group - Annual Report 2003-04 p.7
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The SDMG is responsible for the development of 
the strategic policy framework around disaster 
management and for maintaining relationships with 
the Commonwealth government and non-government 
agencies. It is advised on available resources 
both within and outside the state that could be 
deployed during a disaster. It provides reports and 
recommendations to the responsible minister and 
based on this knowledge, prepares the State’s Disaster 
Management Plan. Until December 2010, the state 
plan was unchanged since 2008. It was modified on 
December 22 to emphasise the tacit understanding 
of the centrality of local government in any disaster 
response.16 In October-November 2010, the SDMG was 
extended to include the Local Government Association 
of Queensland (LGAQ). Following the disaster and 
subsequent recommendations by the QFCOI interim 
report, its membership again increased to include  
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Surf Life 
Saving Queensland.17 
Importance of leadership 
Effective management of any crisis depends upon 
capable political and administrative leadership, 
whose duties include ‘recognizing emerging threats, 
initiating efforts to mitigate them and deal with their 
consequences’, and in the recovery phase provide 
direction to ‘re-establish a sense of normalcy’ (Boin 
et al 2010, p. 706). As the discussion under highlights, 
both political and administrative leadership across 
jurisdictions and including the private sectors and 
NGOs fulfilled these criteria. Throughout the crisis 
local, state and federal government agencies acted 
collaboratively to restore normalcy and assist those 
affected. In this they were aided by Australia’s 
intergovernmental arrangements that clearly set out 
funding and assistance criteria. 
In 2009 despite previous disasters (i.e. Cyclone 
Larry) being managed reasonably well, the then 
director general of Premier and Cabinet foresaw 
that Queensland may not cope with a more extensive 
disaster. As a result the government commissioned a 
report into Queensland’s disaster arrangements that 
while generally favourable, questioned some aspects 
of Queensland’s disaster management system. It 
concluded that Queensland’s lack of a designated 
coordinator potentially limited Queensland’s capacity 
to respond to a more widespread disaster situation and 
argued that ‘policing organisations have the capacity 
and competence to perform this role on a State-wide 
basis in a scalable way to deal with one or multiple 
disasters’ (O’Sullivan & the Consultancy Bureau, 
2009). It recommended an Assistant Commissioner 
of Police be appointed with overall responsibility for 
state coordination. The report, handed down in 2009 
was enacted in November 2010, one month before the 
flooding commenced.18 
During the 2010-11 events, the police worked alongside 
emergency services personnel and local councils in 
a display of cooperation and teamwork. According 
to senior disaster personnel19, while the importance 
of relationships in crisis management was already 
understood, in the wake of Cyclone Larry (2006) 
they together with a senior police officer set about 
in purposeful consultation with the state’s mayors 
to sure up understandings and to gain trust. Both 
organisations recognised some recommendations 
of the review would not be universally welcomed. As 
one senior official recalled, prior to amendments of 
the State Disaster Act 2003, ‘a lot of shoe leather was 
worn out’ traversing Queensland, in order to reassure 
mayors about the enhanced police role, and to stress 
that police would consult and assist rather than 
adopt the old style command and control approach, 
in the first instance. The feedback from many local 
councils in the aftermath of the crisis, suggest police 
throughout Queensland worked cooperatively and 
sensitively with other emergency personnel and 
local communities (pers. comm., July 2011). In doing 
so, police on the ground in affected communities, 
mirrored the behaviour modelled by deputy police 
commissioner, Ian Stewart, appointed as the state’s 
Disaster Coordinator on the 24 December 2010. 
The timing proved prescient. As those interviewed 
for this study noted, it is unlikely that the old disaster 
model, reliant upon comparatively limited numbers of 
dedicated disaster management personnel from EMQ 
and scores of volunteers being dispatched to where 
ever a local disaster had occurred, could have dealt 
with the unprecedented breadth of the 2010-11 disaster 
that included: 
• all 314 residents evacuated from Theodore by 
helicopter; 
• Condamine and Cardwell evacuated (in the case of 
Condamine, twice); 
• Toowoomba flooding and then the Lockyer  
Valley devastation resulting in the loss of 22 lives, 
with more missing;
16 This added to the four earlier tenets of the disaster plan: the prevent, prepare, respond and recover model, the all hazard response, the 
importance and responsibilities of all levels of the disaster management hierarchy, and ensuring communities were alert to natural disasters in 
their areas (see QFCOI Interim report 2011, p. 113).
17  Queensland Government response to the QFCOI Interim Report, August 2011, p. 10.
18 The commissioning of this report is one factor contributing to changes in the state’s disaster management approach. As such it provides evidence 
of programmatic success, as the changes introduced because of it contributed to the effective response of an unprecedented disaster in 2010-11. 
This report also positively impacted on the final outcome of the 2010-11 crisis which enabled a better response across larger tracts of land than 
would have been possible, if (for example) police had not been given a lead agency role (for more on evaluating success see Marsh and McConnell 
(2010) and Bovens (2010) p. 584-85).
19 Fourteen structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior staff from Director-General down, across a range of 
Queensland’s disaster management agencies: The Department of Community Safety, Emergency Management Queensland, Fire and Rescue 
Service, Queensland Ambulance Service, as well as informal conversations with local government mayors, councillors, and senior police at the 
local government conference attended by the author in 2011 and/or by follow-up phone calls.
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• 310 swift water rescues around the state (AFAC 2011);
• 250 people evacuated from Cairns public and private 
hospitals to Brisbane – making it the largest aero-
medical evacuation ever undertaken in Australia;20 
• Everywhere from Rockhampton north isolated by 
road and rail;
• large areas of Brisbane and Ipswich, including parts 
of their CBDs, underwater;
• One of the most ferocious cyclones (Yasi) ever on 
record building in the Coral Sea; 
• 10,500 people evacuated during TC Yasi, 
• 136 000 residences affected, and 
• a damage bill estimated at $5.8 billion dollars.
This was the first time that police worked alongside 
non-uniformed disaster management staff, out of 
the same complex at Kedron. By all accounts, the 
level of cooperation that existed between uniformed 
police, Fire and Rescue service, and the Queensland 
Ambulance – organisations that all have their own 
distinctive cultures and hierarchies– and non-
uniformed personnel was noteworthy and indicative 
of the emphasis placed on collaboration and the 
importance placed on fostering relationships by senior 
management. ‘We may not all like each other, but we 
certainly respect each other’ was a common refrain. 
From drought to flooding plains – background 
to the crises 
Following years of drought and restrictions on water 
usage, December 2010 was the wettest month in 
Queensland’s recorded history.21 The presence of a 
strong La Nina alongside the normal monsoon season 
ensured Queensland received a record rainfall. It 
was relentless. As dam levels rose, and the ground 
became completely saturated, Queensland braced 
itself for flooding. In the fog of the disaster, with 
events unfolding at a rapid rate in multiple locations, 
and with much of the data imperfect or incomplete, 
Queensland’s disaster management agencies met 
regularly, under the intense scrutiny of the media and 
political spotlight, and implemented a response. 
The SDMG ‘war room’
By early December, some towns in North Queensland 
were already feeling the effects of the heavy rain, while 
in the lead-up to Christmas, Cyclone Tasha dumped 
more rain on Rockhampton and the South-East region. 
The first extraordinary meeting of the SDMG occurred 
on 24th December. The meetings of the SDMG took 
place at the State Disaster Coordination Centre in 
Kedron. The SDMG minutes convey little of the frenetic 
pace of those involved – many more than the eight 
members required to make up a quorum were present 
at every meeting. By the 24th December, members 
of the SDMG as well as the Premier, Deputy Premier, 
Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency 
Services and other relevant ministers were getting 
regular 5am situational reports. Special units and 
the police air wing were on constant stand-by and the 
state was at the highest level of preparedness, with 
road tek (sic) crews ready to be activated and road and 
rail networks being constantly monitored. Despite all 
these preparations, there was still an air of uncertainty 
about whether the state’s resources could cope. It 
was at a meeting on the day before Christmas that the 
chairperson, Ken Smith raised the issue of appointing 
a State Disaster Coordinator (SDC) for the December 
rain event. It was agreed that Deputy Commissioner 
Ian Stewart, from the Queensland Police Service, 
would be the SDC effective immediately. The news was 
quickly relayed to district and local level coordinators. 
As the rain continued, the number of extraordinary 
meetings increased. Beginning in December there 
were four extraordinary meetings on the 24th, 28th, 
30th and 31st. In January, meetings took place on the 
2nd, 4th, 5th and then following the ‘inland tsunami’ 
that devastated Toowoomba and the communities 
down the range in the Lockyer Valley, the number of 
meetings increased to twice daily. As the immediate 
crisis abated, the SDMG meetings returned to one per 
day for the 15th, 16th, 17th, 21st, 29th, 30th and 31st. 
When Cyclone Yasi started bearing down towards 
North Queensland in early February, the numbers of 
meetings again increased to twice daily.22 
Four days after his appointment, on the 28th 
December, Ian Stewart informed the SDMG that many 
local disaster management groups were operational. 
He spoke of ‘hot debriefs’, of disaster declarations 
having been made and the SDMG were told that a 
request for ADF assistance was underway. 
By the 31st December the SDMG were given a 
summary of ‘hot spots around Queensland’ and 
were told that in Emerald, Condamine and Theodore, 
evacuations – in some instances of the entire town 
– had occurred. The ADF was on the ground and 
assisting with evacuations, the Red Cross was offering 
counselling to residents in Condamine and manning 
evacuation centres, meanwhile in Rockhampton 200 
houses had been inundated and plans were underway 
to relocate the Royal Flying Doctors to Gladstone. In 
Yeppoon there was a problem with what to do with 
a ripe and ready for market pineapple crop, while in 
Bundaberg the SDMG dealt with rumours (later proved 
false) that the Paradise Dam had breached its wall. 
Returning from a tour of affected regions the SDC 
reported that the state recovery committee had met, 
meanwhile, as Queensland’s coalmines filled with 
water, and the loss in export revenue was predicted to 
be significant, the Premier wrote to the Prime Minister 
requesting level six assistance.23
20 (see too URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/editions/5302/5302.pdf)
21 Australian Bureau of Meteorology, Special climate statement 24: an extremely wet end to 2010 leads to widespread flooding across eastern 
Australia, 2011, p.2, cited in the Interim Report 2011, p. 24.
22 The information contained in this paragraph and much of the information about what was discussed at the meetings that follow were sourced 
from the SDMG extraordinary minutes, provided to the QFCOI and a copy provided by the DCS to the author.
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While these events were widespread and difficult 
enough, by the 5th January Major General Mick Slater 
had been appointed to the position of chairperson of 
the Queensland Flood Recovery taskforce and the 
director-general and chair of the SDMG announced 
that with this and the Commonwealth Recovery 
Cabinet sub-committee now in place, meetings of the 
SDMG would be scaled back in order to allow these 
bodies to take a lead in the recovery. The director 
general of DCS, Jim McGowan raised the issue of leave 
management for volunteers and of the need to have a 
fatigue management policy. No further extraordinary 
meetings of the SDMG were planned. Then the 
unthinkable happened. 
Managing the unmanageable
Just like much of Queensland, rain in December and 
January had left the Toowoomba catchment area 
saturated. In late December, the three dams servicing 
Toowoomba’s population of 162 057 had reached 53.2 
per cent. By the 10th January this level had risen 
to more than double that (127.2 per cent). That day, 
two intense thunderstorms crossed Queensland. By 
11.00am they had joined and were headed in a south-
westerly direction, towards the Toowoomba range. 
The heavy rain that resulted caused ‘severe flash 
flooding’ that drowned a mother and her son as they 
drove through a city intersection. As the QFCOI interim 
flood report noted ‘this was not a situation in which 
any agency could have effectively warned residents of 
what was to come’ (p. 230). The rainfall had already 
triggered the Toowoomba regional council to call 
a meeting to consider activating the local disaster 
management group. Present at that meeting were 
representatives of the Queensland Ambulance Service, 
the Queensland Police Service, Queensland Fire and 
Rescue, and Emergency Management Queensland, 
Telstra and the ABC. As they deliberated, calls started 
coming in about cars and people being swept away.24 
The SDMG met twice daily throughout this time. At the 
meeting on Wednesday 12th, along with the Premier, 
Deputy Premier and state ministers sat the Prime 
Minister, Julia Gillard, Senator Joe Ludwig, Defence 
Minister Stephen Smith and the Chief of the Defence 
Force Angus Houston. Also present either in person 
or via telephone were the mayors of Brisbane, Ipswich 
and Somerset, along with representatives from BoM 
and District Disaster Coordinators from Brisbane, 
Ipswich and Toowoomba. 
While a working party made up representatives from 
ENERGEX, Police, Department of Public Works, 
Brisbane City Council and the deputy premier dealt 
with the imminent loss of power to the Brisbane CBD, 
the SDMG was informed by BoM representatives that 
the dams above Brisbane had peaked at 191 per cent 
the night before, and that controlled water releases 
would need to continue for the next two days until their 
flood compartments were empty. 
The State Disaster Coordinator then reported on the 
conditions across Queensland. In Central Queensland 
the road to the south of Rockhampton was still 
closed, meanwhile the river at Chinchilla was flooded. 
Condamine had once again been evacuated, while St 
George, Surat, Warwick and Stanthorpe were being 
closely observed. In Toowoomba, police were still 
attempting to access areas of Murphy’s Creek and 
Grantham to carry out search and rescue activities. 
This had been delayed due to poor weather conditions. 
In the township of Lowood, eight roof top rescues 
had been conducted (scores more were conducted 
throughout this event). The police were preparing for 
the rivers in Brisbane and Ipswich to peak. In Ipswich, 
ten areas had been evacuated and there were currently 
12000 people registered at evacuation centres. 
As flooding of the capital city began, two evacuation 
centres were established as the central business 
district was shut down. Over the next few days the 
SDMG would deal, among other things, with:
• Many public transport pontoons, a floating 
restaurant, and barges that had either broken free 
or were at risk of breaking free from their moorings. 
All threatened critical infrastructure. Further up on 
the Moggill stretch of the river, the Moggill ferry had 
broken free of one of the chains that secured it and 
was at risk too of being swept down the river; 
• There was concern that a major private hospital 
near the Toowong reach of the river may need to be 
evacuated; 
• All trains in the Mayne Rail yard had been moved 
and the yard was ready for evacuation if required; 
• City cats and ferries had been removed from the 
river;
• Bus ways around the city centre were closed;
• A major piece of urban infrastructure, a floating, 
concrete walkway, had broken free of its moorings 
and along with numerous privately owned boats and 
pontoons was headed toward the river mouth and 
risking major bridges; 
• Many suburbs across the city were flooding, with 
vehicle access and electricity supplies cut;
As these events continued to escalate, the SDMG 
ensured that towns and regions across the state were 
supplied with essential goods, access to clean drinking 
water, food and other supplies. 
When the flood waters subsided, over 7000 volunteers 
armed with brooms, mops, gloves, buckets and 
shovels, joined 600 soldiers in the clean up around the 
capital. The Brisbane City Council organised buses 
23 Level Six refers to Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC). DACC Category 6 is support to civil authorities in the performance of non-
emergency law enforcement related tasks where there is no likelihood that Defence personnel will be required to use force. The procedures for 
processing Category 6 requests is in annex H see: (http://www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/file/0005/7673/Paule_Kevin_attachment.
pdf, p. 5)
24 The QFCOI interim report (2011, p. 228-33) details these events.
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to ferry volunteers to the worst affected areas, as 
strangers and passers-by pitched in to clean up the 
mud and muck. While this process was not perfect and 
later some people complained that there were so many 
volunteers ‘we felt like sea-gulls fighting over a chip’, 
others remarked on the ‘amazing sense of duty’ that 
had been displayed (Papadikis, 2011). 
In the following weeks the SDMG would be confronted 
with another natural disaster as Cyclone Yasi formed 
off the North Queensland coast. In the days leading 
up to the 3rd February, voluntary evacuations 
commenced as the ADF prepared to evacuate 234 
patients from the Cairns base hospital. The day 
before Yasi made landfall, BoM notified the SDMG 
that it had been ‘upgraded to a Category 5’ cyclone 
and that ‘severe weather conditions’ were expected. 
Yasi’s wind speed was measured at 285 km/h when 
it hit landfall at Mission Beach. Before the SDMG 
meeting on the Wednesday before the cyclone hit, a 
teleconference occurred between all police areas in 
the north of the state. The message was conveyed 
that ‘emergency services may not be able to respond 
to calls for assistance and that people may have to 
be self-sufficient for some time after the cyclone hit’. 
Police were warned to ‘prepare for significant trauma 
in the community’. Individual agencies including the 
ADF, DCS, Ergon Energy, Optus, LGAQ, Department of 
Transport and Main Roads, Queensland Health briefed 
the SDMG and the Premier about their preparations. 
The literature on crisis management often refers to 
crisis in relation to national security (defence) issues 
rather than natural disasters per se. Furthermore, most 
of the literature uses overseas examples.25 Connery’s 
observations about crisis management, particularly 
as it relates to the East Timor intervention, indicates 
there are some common themes that are applicable to 
both security crises and natural disaster emergencies. 
In particular Connery notes that Australian crisis 
policymaking ‘tends toward the collegial approach’ and 
that this is in part due to the time pressures involved 
in crisis decision-making (Connery, 2010, pp. 142, 143). 
McGowan (2012) supports that noting that ‘relationships 
need to be developed during “peace time” so that 
roles and responsibilities of all agencies and response 
personnel are clear’. 
Through interviews conducted for this study, from the 
evidence provided in various governmental reports, as 
well as accounts provided by the SDMG extraordinary 
minutes, it is apparent that relationships and networks 
developed over a long period of time were a vital 
part in successfully managing these disasters. The 
contrasting evidence of Hurricane Katrina highlights 
this point, where a lack of trust, partisan politics and 
an uncoordinated response extended the suffering of 
thousands of New Orleans’ citizens. This study argues 
that Queensland’s regional pattern of development, 
its emphasis on a bottom up, local government in the 
first instance response and the importance placed 
on fostering relationships that is well-recognised and 
seemingly practiced by the senior staff of Queensland’s 
emergency management agencies, was a vital 
contributor to Queensland’s successful response. 
Queensland Emergency Operations Centre, Ambulance Communications. Courtesy of Department of Community Safety. 
25 Scholars such as Allan McConnell (University of Sydney) and Paul t’Hart (ANU) have both published extensively on crisis management, but most 
often use overseas cases as examples. 
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The 2010-11 disaster –  
a retrospective review of the evidence
As large tracts of the state vanished under flood-water, 
the management of the response and recovery effort, 
led by the state’s peak coordinating group, the SDMG 
along with the actions of ordinary Queenslanders, later 
dubbed the ‘mud army’, gained world-wide attention. 
The Queensland Police Service’s innovative use of social 
media to communicate with the state’s residents would 
later be hailed as ‘a world leading effort’ in ‘public 
engagement and emergency disaster responsiveness’ 
(Queensland Police Service, 2011). As the disasters were 
unfolding, frequent media briefings by the Premier, 
flanked by experts in hydrology, or in uniform, provided 
information and calming reassurance. Her heartfelt 
appeal to Queenslanders succeeded in rallying the 
troops and waking a spirit of community that was 
palpable, a fact that delegations from overseas later 
commented on (Lutton, 2012).26 In the initial weeks 
of recovery, the Premier’s poll ratings received a 
substantial, if temporary, boost (Walker, 2011). 
Across Australia, partisan politics diminish during 
times of natural disasters, as parties, politicians, and 
community groups from across the state and beyond, 
respond. Yet as Boin et al 2008 argue, disasters always 
have a political element to them, and it is the political 
dimension that often inhibit necessary reforms, 
including the development of more resilient, less 
dependent communities, despite this being a purported 
and agreed to aim of state and federal governments 
(see COAG 2010; Kapucu & Ozerdem, 2013 p.217). 
Former Attorney-General, Robert McClelland (2012) 
gave voice to this most recently: 
The trouble is that politicians at all levels tend to 
focus and want to be seen after a disaster occurs 
because that’s when it has most media attention. 
To get that, to be part of that scene, there is a lot of 
money that goes into post disaster compensation 
payments.
In responding to the need to better target government 
resources he continued: 
Now these are $1000 payments that go to 
individuals. They’re in addition to hardship payments 
that are jointly funded by the states and territories. 
So what I have consistently said, we need to evaluate 
how efficient these payments are, these $1000 
compensation payments. Firstly to streamline them 
so that we target them to those who are most in 
need, but secondly to look at shifting a substantial 
amount of that money into preventative measures 
and one good example is last year, following the 
Queensland floods and cyclone Yasi, was about 
$840 million in these $1000 payments that went out 
to individuals. Now there was certainly a spike in 
consumer spending, plasma TVs and so forth, but 
there was no spike in insurance policies or buying 
generators for the next event.
McClelland’s comments draw attention to the political 
context surrounding disaster management. In the case 
of the Bligh government, polls indicated an immediate 
15-point boost in the polls, which quickly dissipated after 
the event. The short-term gain in popularity was probably 
helped by the $1000 largely untargeted payments 
handed out to residents, in some instances for seemingly 
inconsequential hardship (no power for a relatively 
short period of time). However, as some policy analysts 
have noted, the longer-term consequences of these 
untargeted payments include raising expectations of what 
government’s should do, reduce individual resilience as 
a result and limit the resources that could be spent on 
mitigation programs that would be cheaper and of more 
benefit in the longer term (see McGowan, 2012). 
Conclusion – what does this tell us?
There are many lessons that can be learnt  
from Queensland’s disaster of 2010-11. Most 
importantly, this paper argues that there is a clear 
advantage to having all the state’s director-generals 
serving as members of the peak decision making 
body – in Queensland’s case – the SDMG. Effectively, 
its whole-of-government perspective confirms 
Queensland does have an ‘all-agency’ approach to 
its disaster management model. While effectively 
operating as a ‘war-cabinet’ during times of disasters, 
(meeting twice daily during the December/ January 
events), in ‘peace-time’ the SDMG meets quarterly 
Queensland’s ‘all hazard, all agency’ approach to its 
disaster management arrangements.
26 Visiting overseas delegations from overseas countries have reportedly been amazed at the level of volunteerism on display during Australian 
disasters, noting such things don’t occur in their countries (pers. correspondence with senior emergency personnel 2012).
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to plan, strategise and prepare for future disasters 
(DCS senior personnel, pers. comm., June 2011). One 
important by-product of the all-agency approach is 
that any decision taken at those meetings are then 
enacted, providing a level of surety to those further 
down the chain of command, as well as those outside 
of government (i.e. insurance companies and NGOs). 
Queensland’s particular pattern of development  
and the decentralised nature of the state have  
perhaps necessitated a greater emphasis on the 
bottom-up approach than elsewhere. The state’s 
disaster management alliance places an emphasis on 
the centrality of local government. This helps ensure a 
useful and timely information flow to the SDMG from the 
regions, and ultimately a more coordinated approach to 
planning between local and state jurisdictions. 
While these arrangements are articulated in state 
and federal legislation, and seem to be understood, 
what is not so immediately apparent is how these 
arrangements contribute to building trust between 
the disaster agencies – many of whom have different 
perspectives on what should be prioritised. Interviews 
with key personnel at the state level, as well as more 
informal conversations with local councillors, confirm 
that the relationships developed during ‘peace-time’, 
enabled a level of understanding and communication 
during the fog and urgency of a disaster. Leadership 
commitment at the state and local level is crucial to 
building the networks that are a fundamental part 
of any successful disaster management approach. 
These networks are not just between government 
agencies and the different tiers but also between 
private companies and NGOs, who all have input into 
the SDMG. Finally, the Queensland response to the 
2010-11 natural disasters highlighted the importance of 
coordination, in clearly understanding what needed to 
be done and who was responsible for doing it; in having 
the most up to date information available and in having 
a flexible and scalable set of arrangements. 
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